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PLAY HERMENEUTICS AGAIN, SAM
Bruce Krajewski
“There are no things to be, / Only a detective.”
—-John Ashbery, “Nothing to Steal”
In The Maltese Falcon, Sam Spade, Joel Cairo, and Brigid O ’Shaughnessy 
quarrel in Spade’s room , and the police arrive and want to take all three to 
the police station. Spade, however, invents a story to explain the quarrel, 
confuses the police, and causes the authorities to think that the skirmish was 
concocted, a ruse for the trio’s entertainm ent. The next m orning, Spade 
meets Cairo in a hotel lobby, and Cairo says he has been up all night. He 
claims the police took him in for questioning.
“W hat they shake out o f yuh?” Spade asks.
“Shake out? Not one thing. I adhered to the course you indicated earlier 
in your rooms, but I certainly wish you would have invented a m ore reason­
able story. I felt distincdy like an idiot repeating it.”
Spade replies, “Don’t worry about the story’s goofiness. A sensible one 
would have had us all in the cooler.” 1
At present, you are in the same situation as the police when they hear 
Spade’s odd, contrived explanation about the quarrel. W hat is he talking 
about? Why is he telling us this? Quite an alien way to begin a paper. He 
must be goofy.
W hat do you do when you encounter something alien or goofy? Many 
times, you dismiss it, claim that it is esoteric, impenetrable, senseless, foolish, 
or even m ore extreme, insane. For instance, suppose you have never seen 
King Lear, and you arrive at the theatre during Act III, Scene IV when 
Gloucester asks Edgar who he is, and Edgar responds:
Poor Tom, that eats the swimming frog, the toad, the todpole, the wall-newt, and the 
water, that in the fury o f  his heart, when the foul fiend rages, eats cow-dung for sallets;
 
swallows the old rat and the ditch-dog; drinks the green mantle o f  the standing pool; who 
is whipt from tithing to tithing, and stock-punish’d and imprison’d; who hath had three 
suits to his back, six shirts to his body—Horse to ride, and weapon to wear; But mice 
and rats and such small deer, Have been Tom ’s food for seven long year. Beware my 
follower.
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Edgar says he is Tom? And what is all this gibberish that Edgar, or Tom, 
is uttering? Surely Edgar has lost his m ind.2
Sam Spade’s goofy story and Edgar’s speech are certainly not things we 
would write, because, as Richard Lanham says, most o f us are taught the 
C-B-S theory o f writing: clarity, brevity, and sincerity.3 Lanham sees two 
types o f prose: transparent and opaque.4 We want, and expect, people to 
write prose that is as clear and transparent as cellophane wrapping, and just 
as disposable. Opaque prose stops you at the surface, as Edgar’s speech does. 
You cannot see through it, for it is dark, bewildering, unsettling. It is some­
thing that claims our attention. For some reason, our writing textbooks tell 
us to be always clear, that the best style is the never-noticed. We think people 
should be as literal as possible. Today, anyone who wrote like Shakespeare 
would be considered “odd.”
Ancient interpreters and rhetoricians thought differently. Rhetoricians 
have understood for centuries that sometimes to make things plain, you 
need to darken them, or make them  obscure. How do things become clearer 
by darkening? For instance, a black and white photograph contains sharp 
dark areas, deep blacks that make the light areas m ore distinct. You might 
have surmised by now that the ancients divided texts into the plain and the 
obscure, and naturally they preferred the obscure ones. W ithout being 
simplistic, you could say that the ancients believed something like this: “that 
that which is easy to understand is not w orth understanding except for those 
who can understand nothing else.”5 They saw also that what is obscure is 
often valuable.
W hen you know that something is “w rong” with what you are reading— 
that is, when you discover that what is written, o r spoken, is garbled, 
contradictory, unbelievable, like Edgar’s speech—then you know it is trying 
to speak to you, to draw you into its secrets, its darkness. “After all, if 
everything were plain, nothing would be required to be studied; everything 
would be commonplace—much would be known but little would be under­
stood.”6 That which does no t require interpretation requires little, if any, 
thought. Being in an enigmatic text, o r being in the dark often leads to 
insight, and to understanding. You will recall that Gloucester begins to make 
accurate glosses on life only after he is blind.
Similarly, Sam Spade deals only with difficult, mysterious cases. If the case 
is plain, clear to ordinary understanding, then there is no need for a detec­
tive, an interpreter. The case o f the Maltese falcon appeals to Spade because 
o f its complexity and darkness. The falcon itself is said to be dark. Its value 
is no t obvious, for though it is encrusted with jewels, it has been covered with 
a coating o f black enamel. To some people who have had possession o f the 
falcon it has m eant nothing. They were not stopped, drawn in, by the 
surface. They dismissed its dark covering. To them, it was merely a black 
enam eled figure.
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We can say that the falcon is an example o f figuration. Think o f figuration 
as darkening, say coating something with enamel, or writing something, 
putting black on white, darkness on paper, and we can com prehend dark­
ness by learning about figuration, by perhaps even composing our own 
m etaphors, allegories, fables, and what Joel Cairo would call “goofy stories.” 
Allegories and the like are discourses that can be taken in m ore than one 
way, like a goofy story—discourses whose surplus o f meaning produces not 
negation, but new sources o f understanding. That which requires interpreta­
tion requires thought. Is it reasonable to think that were we to construct an 
enigmatic text, we would then be better able to understand other dark 
works?
Also, we should attend to characters like Sam Spade, because he is not 
plain, obvious, predictable—as is the insipid prose we write when we want 
to be perfecdy clear. As his nam e suggests, Spade is a dark character. In fact, 
Brigid O ’Shaughnessy calls Spade the wildest, m ost unpredictable person 
she has ever known. And Kaspar Gutman, the m an who has spent years 
searching for the falcon, says to Spade: “There’s never any telling what 
you’ll say or do next, except that it’s bound to be something astonishing.” 
In other words, Spade is not always the same; he knows what a situation calls 
for and acts accordingly.
Spade’s astonishing actions and his goofy stories, applied judiciously, 
prevent him from coming under the control o f the police, o r o f Gutman. As 
you rem em ber, Spade says a sensible, plain story would have resulted in his 
arrest along with the others. In such a situation, to be plain would be foolish. 
Encouraging people to write everything plainly is foolish as well. Not only 
does such a m ethod deny changing means for changing situations, but it also 
denies that some people might no t have “plain” personalities that would 
manifest themselves in other than a plain style. Making people think that 
clarity suffices in every situation subjects them  to possible m anipulation by 
others, gives others power over them. As Lanham says, “Articulate speech 
can get you into trouble.”7
Although I sidestepped an im portant question earlier, now is the appro­
priate time to re-introduce it: W hat do you do when you encounter some­
thing alien or goofy, like Edgar’s speech or the story Spade tells the police? 
If you are open to such situations, and wish to understand instead o f to 
dismiss, if you wish to make the alien familiar and sensible, hermeneutics 
can help. Hermeneutics is no t a m ethod or a set o f rules for interpretation, 
but a blossoming and difficult family o f questions about understanding that 
comes down to us from  antiquity, and in m odem  times by way o f M artin 
Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer, particularly G adam er’s book Truth 
and Method.
The expression “herm eneutics” derives from  the Greek verb hermeneuein. 
As Heidegger tells us, that verb is related to the noun hermeneus, which is 
referable to the god Hermes. Hermes is the divine messenger. Since he has
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communication with the gods, he brings the message o f destiny; hermeneuein 
is that exposition which brings tidings because it can listen to a message. 
Hermeneuein means to bring what is hidden out into the open; it means to 
interpret.
Given that Hermes carries words from  the gods, his messages were often 
oracular, ambiguous, strange, and his appearance was not always welcome— 
he was said to lead the souls into the underworld at death. Hermes invented 
language and speech. In the Cratylus, Socrates points out that Hermes could 
be called interpreter o r messenger, but also thief, liar, or contriver. You 
m ight call him  an earlier version o f Sam Spade. Socrates says that words, 
Herm es’ invention, have the power to reveal, but also to conceal, and to 
withhold. Speech can signify almost anything, and turn things this way and 
that; indeed we can never get a grasp on words, hold them  still, fix them 
(as if there were something wrong with them). W ords’ meanings always 
change, because contexts are always changing. It is in the Cratylus that 
Hermes begins to receive a tainted reputation. You might find Hermes even 
m ore puzzling and interesting when you rem em ber that his son is some sort 
o f m utant, sm ooth and divine above and goatlike below. Viewed as a freak­
ish creature, Pan looks much less attractive than when we recall Cummings, 
who called Herm es’ son “the little lame balloon m an who whistles far and 
wee.”
It is appropriate that Hermes is associated with hermeneutics, because 
Hermes is a messenger, someone whose existence and purpose depend on 
dialogue. He takes messages from  god to god, or from  the gods to mortals; 
he is the em bodim ent and the m ovem ent o f discourse. “From the side o f 
hermeneutics, we can say that to understand anything means to enter into 
a dialogue with it.”8 Dialogue is the give-and-take between two, the question 
and response, the circular movement. That dialogue is prim ary to under­
standing shows that understanding is a social, no t a private act, nor a mental 
operation. Thus W ittgenstein’s statem ent that there is no such thing as a 
private language. (Also, W ittgenstein notes the im portance—for understand­
ing—o f what is no t plain, not quotidian: “How does one know straight off 
that it makes sense to say ‘Perhaps everything strikes this person as unreal 
[unwirklich], although he never speaks o f it’? O f course I have here purpose­
ly chosen a very rare experience. For because it is no t one o f the everyday 
experiences, one looks m ore sharply at the use o f the words.”)9
Dialogue as a way o f understanding between people can be reasonably 
accepted, but we w ant to ask the question: How do you enter into a dialogue 
with a text? Let me offer you some words from  an essay titled “Verbal 
Interaction,” which has been attributed to the Russian critic Mikhail Bakhtin. 
He says that dialogue is no t restricted to “direct face-to-face vocalized verbal 
communication between persons, but also verbal communication o f any 
type whatever. A book, that is, a verbal perform ance in print, is also an 
elem ent o f verbal communication.” 10
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This part about books as part o f a dialogue is strange (a clue to its 
importance). W hat do you say to a book? Well, you always have questions 
about a text: W hat does it mean? W ho is its author? Why was it written? 
W hat was the social situation at the time it was written? W ho put it in the 
marketplace? W hat question is this text an answer to? Why is the text 
constructed in this m anner? As in the Platonic (play-tonic) dialogues, the 
dialogue with a text begins with questioning. You will know you w ant to 
understand when you start questioning. And the text can answer those 
questions; it can speak to you, and thus be a partner in the dialogue.
Perhaps this can be better understood through Paul Ricoeur, another 
im portant figure in m odem  hermeneutics. He says, “W hat m ust be inter­
preted in a text is a proposed world which I could inhabit and wherein I 
could project one o f my own m ost possibilities. This is what I call the world 
o f the text, the world proper to this unique text.” 11 The text proposes a way 
o f being in the world (might a variation o f W ittgenstein be appropriate here: 
A text’s meaning depends on its usage?). Ricoeur emphasizes that appropria­
tion, which I will address in a m om ent, is a key part o f hermeneutics, and 
that ultimately, what you appropriate is that proposed world o f the text. 
“That world is not behind the text, as a hidden intention would be, but in front 
of it, as that which the work unfolds, discovers, reveals.”12
Here, The Maltese Falcon as film can be introduced as a supporting analogy, 
for when talking about a projected world, what is m ore appropriate than 
film? To carry through with Ricoeur’s image, we could imagine ourselves 
standing in the light from  the projector (one m ust activate the projector 
oneself) that is showing The Maltese Falcon, and we would then not be a 
shadow in that world, but a participant, perhaps Sam Spade’s friend. This 
conflicts with the idea o f a “close reading,” because to be close to the beam  
is still to be outside o f the projected world. You must enter the world. To 
understand is to be let in on something, so you let yourself go in to the world 
projected by the text, somewhat like Alice stepping through the Looking 
Glass. Even if you are close, you are still an outsider, on your side o f the 
looking glass, and the text rem ains an object, for there rem ains a distance 
between you and the text. This idea o f the dialogue also suggests something 
other than a critical reading, for a critical reading removes the possibility o f 
a dialogue. Can you enter into a dialogue with someone or something that 
has got you under analysis?13
W hat you do when you allow the text to speak to you is to make its 
meaning real for you, to appropriate the text, that is, to make it your own. 
W hen you make a text your own, you are able to tell someone else what 
the text has to say. You make your own what was initially alien. The aim 
o f all hermeneutics is to struggle against cultural distance and historical 
alienation. Interpretation renders contem porary and similar, or in W ittgen­
stein’s words, it helps things “hang together.” In effect, the past appears 
through a text (though the past appears in other ways) and has something 
to say to you as reader, and you listen, take in what it says, and respond.14
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Here again we see the give-and-take, the speaking and the listening, the 
to-and-fro movem ent o f appropriation. As Gadam er says, this to-and-fro 
m ovem ent is like play.15 Think o f play as a way to appropriation, for play 
is the perform ance o f movement. W hen you read a text, you are receiving 
an invitation to undergo an imaginative variation o f your ego. The Looking 
Glass beckons Alice to move, to enter. She is no t to rem ain outside, staring 
at herself in the looking glass, but her task is to stop seeing only herself, to 
lose herself by stepping through the m irror. Ricoeur says, “As reader, I find 
myself only by losing myself.” Like Alice, after you are in the world o f the 
text, you are no longer the same. Likewise, play is an experience which 
transform s those who participate in it. For instance, there is a curious lack 
o f decisiveness in the playing consciousness, which makes it impossible to 
decide between belief and non-belief. G adam er says that “play fulfills its 
purpose only if the player loses himself in his play.” 16 Here, play is serious, 
and Claude Richard says, “The basis o f m odernity is the seriousness o f 
playfulness.” 17 Think o f W ittgenstein’s “language-games.”
W hat does this have to do with a work o f art, a text? G adam er’s response
is:
The work o f  art has its true being in the fact that it becomes an experience changing the 
person experiencing it. The ‘subject’ o f  the experience o f  art, that which remains and 
endures, is not the subjectivity o f the person who experiences it, but the work itself. This 
is the point at which the mode o f being o f play becomes significant. For play has its own 
essence, independent o f  the consciousness o f  the those who play.
The players are not the subjects o f  play; instead play merely reaches presentation 
through the players.18
Similarly, a text can reach presentation only through a player, a participant, 
a reader, one who is willing to be hermeludical.
Another part o f appropriation involves what is called the hermeneutical 
circle, something hermeneutics appropriated from  ancient rhetoric, which 
describes how the ways o f understanding and interpretation, part and whole 
are related in a circular way: in order to understand the whole, it is necessary 
to understand the parts, while to understand the parts it is necessary to have 
some com prehension o f the whole. For instance, you will recall the situation 
I m entioned concerning entering a theatre in the middle o f a performance 
o f King Lear. Edgar’s speech makes litde sense severed from  the whole. Why 
Edgar pretends to be Tom  becomes clear only when you have the rest o f 
the pieces, and then you can construct a plausible context in which to place 
Edgar’s words.
Gadam er has described the hermeneutical circle as the interplay o f the 
m ovem ent o f tradition and the m ovem ent o f the interpreter. Interpretation 
stands in and is conditioned by tradition, and is necessarily rooted in a 
historical situation. How m ight we be conditioned by tradition? For instance, 
our understanding is conditioned by the historical accumulation o f previous 
interpretations, by the history o f things themselves, and, as Jurgen H aber­
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mas points out, by those who control the production and distribution of 
texts. Unless you know the history o f the Maltese falcon, it will be merely 
a cheap ornam ent to you. Once you know that it is studded with jewels, then 
its value is revealed (or is it im portant that the characters believe it has value, 
and that they act on that belief?). As for the historical accumulation of 
interpretations, we pay attention to King Lear, because our ancestors have 
told us it is a great drama. In addition, we do not take Lear to be a play 
representing a unique form, for we know that many tragedies came before 
Lear. To recognize tradition is to see that we are in history, and that history, 
which is m ediated by texts, has a claim on us. Since history is always 
changing, and since interpreters change over time through increased experi­
ence, we can say that we are always understanding differently, which explains 
why our understanding o f Lear differs from  that o f a 17 th-century in terpret­
er. History gives us precedents for new interpretations, just as laws are 
altered according to new circumstances. If you think o f the law as a text, you 
see that the law is not static, but fluid, changeable, and laws are applied 
differently in time. The issue o f precedents brings up G adam er’s point that 
in order to understand the past, it is necessary to try to com prehend one’s 
own presuppositions and prejudgm ents in order to realize how these m edi­
ate one’s perception o f the past.
You might ask, why bother with texts from  the past? From a herm eneu­
tical viewpoint, a work o f art is precisely that about which we cannot be 
indifferent. The artwork is historical no t in being a m om ent in history, but 
rather being a condition for, or even a generating force of, subsequent 
cultural achievements. Hermeneutics does not allow for disinterestedness. 
We m ust become aware o f our historicity, because we are in history, and 
because a better understanding o f history can lead to fuller self-understand­
ing. Ricoeur tells us “it must be said that we understand ourselves only by 
the long detour o f the signs o f hum anity deposited in cultural works. W hat 
would we know of love and hate, o f m oral feelings, o f all that we call the 
self, if these had not been brought to language and articulated by litera­
ture?” 19 Understanding the past m ight also yield truth. Is it true that the 
truth  o f things lies in their history?
Let us go back in the history o f this paper to the example o f the detective. 
For the mom ent, think o f Spade not as an individual, but as a type of 
individual, namely the detective. As a detective, Spade unearths things, 
uncovers them, brings them  out into the open. You recall that we character­
ized interpretation this way, as a bringing o f what is hidden into the open. 
The Greek verb hermeneuein means this same thing, to interpret. Thus we 
can say fairly that detectives are herm eneutical characters. They enjoy enig­
mas, and are always involved in mysteries. They gather clues, that is, parts 
o f the whole, and try to see how the parts, the clues, make the whole 
comprehensible. Surely, we think o f detectives as people who are involved, 
and who are often in danger, which m eans the case makes a claim on them.
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For example, the case could claim the detective’s life. It seems there is much 
to be learned from detectives, even poor ones.
W hat can we learn from  a poor detective? Consider the detective nam ed 
Mr. G—, Prefect o f the Parisian Police, in Poe’s “The Purloined Letter,” a 
work which “has become the arena where one o f the fundam ental debates 
o f contem porary criticism is being held.”20 Poe says the Prefect “had a 
fashion o f calling everything ‘odd’ that was beyond his comprehension, and 
thus lived amid an absolute legion o f ‘oddities.’”21 Mr. G— wants to locate 
a letter in the possession o f Minister D—, a letter which gives the minister 
a g6od deal o f political power. The Prefect has applied his methods diligent­
ly, using microscopes, sticking needles into the bindings o f Minister D—’s 
books, checking for cavities in the furniture where the missing missive might 
be hidden, but the Prefect comes up empty, so he turns to Dupin, who, 
through dialogue, spots the difficulty immediately. Dupin explains that the 
Prefect’s measures “were good in their kind, and well executed; their defect 
lay in their being inapplicable to the case, and to the man. . . .”22 “[The 
Police] consider only their own ideas o f ingenuity; and, in searching for 
anything hidden, advert only to the modes in which they would have hidden 
it.”23 All that the Prefect has done, Dupin says, is but “an exaggeration of 
the application o f the one principle or set o f principles o f search.”24
Dupin and Sam Spade are herm eneutical characters, because they under­
stand the principles o f ancient rhetoric. Knowing how to adapt to particular 
situations and particular characters or audiences is what Aristode’s Rhetoric 
is all about. W hat the Prefect is lacking in his efforts to find the letter is what 
Aristotle calls phronesis, practical wisdom.25 As Dupin tells us, the Prefect 
applies the same m ethods regardless o f the case. Thus his m ethod is ahistor- 
ical. Reliance on a single m ethod—even a m ethod o f criticism—ignores the 
historicity o f things, and denies that particular situations call for varying 
approaches, just as different audiences call for different speeches. Sam Spade 
pays attention to Aristotle, for he realizes that an audience composed of 
police in his room s calls for a goofy story. Continually, Spade illustrates his 
resourcefulness. He gets Brigid O ’Shaughnessy to adm it that she committed 
m urder. After she confesses, she says to Spade: “You’ve been playing with 
me; just pretending you cared, to trap me like this.” Here we see Spade 
violated the ‘S’ in the C-B-S theory o f living: He was not sincere. Had he been 
sincere, he would not have solved the case. The situation with Brigid did not 
allow for sincerity.
The situation Dupin finds him self in when he goes to the M inister’s hotel 
does no t call for sincerity either, for Dupin m ust discover a way to look for 
the letter w ithout drawing the Minister’s suspicion. So Dupin dons dark 
glasses (Why green? A color that indicates Dupin’s fertile vision?), and pre­
tends to have weak sight. Barbara Johnson says, “Dupin’s feigned blindness 
is a vigilant act o f lucidity.”26 As Gloucester is able to discern better in 
darkness, so Dupin sees rem arkably well in his dark and “duplicitous”
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world.27 In fact, Dupin says at the beginning o f the story: “If it is any point 
requiring reflection, we shall examine it to better purpose in the dark.”28 By 
seeing that his m eeting with the minister calls for dark glasses, and by seeing 
that certain kinds o f thinking are suited for darkness, Dupin, like Spade, 
illustrates that good detectives know their ancient rhetoric.
Since antiquity hermeneutics has had an allegiance with rhetoric:
Where, indeed, but to rhetoric should the theoretical examination o f  interpretation turn? 
Rhetoric has been the only advocate o f  a claim to truth that defends the probable, the 
eikos, and that which is convincing to the ordinary reason, against the claim o f  science 
to accept as true only what can be demonstrated and tested! Convincing and persuading 
without being able to prove— these are obviously as much the aim and measure o f  
understanding and interpretation as they are the aim and measure o f  the art o f  oration 
and persuasion.29
To return  to “The Purloined Letter” by way o f rhetoric, I am not direcdy 
entering into the debate between Lacan and Derrida, which has been ex­
plored by others, because that is not my purpose here.30 However, Barbara 
Johnson’s comments in her review o f Derrida’s and Lacan’s approaches to 
Poe are appropriate in relation to G adam er’s rem arks about rhetoric and 
the probable. Johnson writes: “If the letter is precisely that which dictates 
the rhetorical indeterm ination o f any theoretical discourse about it, then the 
oscillation between unequivocal statem ents o f undecidability and ambigu­
ous assertions o f decidability is precisely one o f the letter’s inevitable effects.”31 
To put it less precisely, the letter, like an allegory, can be taken in m ore than 
one way, and thus its multiplicity o f meaning gives us new opportunities for 
interpretation.
“There’s no mystery here!”—but then how can we have so much as believed that there 
was one?—Well, I have retraced the path over and over again and over and over again 
been surprised; and I never had the idea that here one can understand something— So 
“There’s no mystery here!” means “Just look about you!”32
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